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Abstract 
For over three decades, negotiated planning obligations have been the primary form of land value capture in 
England.   Diffusing and evolving over the last decade, a significant policy innovation has been the use of 
financial calculations to estimate the extent to which policies on planning obligations for actual, proposed 
development projects and in plan making affect the financial viability of development.  This paper assesses 
the extent to which the use of financial appraisals has provided a robust, just and practical procedure to 
support land value capture.  It is concluded that development viability appraisals are saturated with intrinsic 
uncertainty and that land value capture that is based on such calculations is, to some extent, capricious.    In 
addition, clear incentives for developers and land owners to bias viability calculations, the economic 
dependence of many viability consultants on developers and land owners, a lack of transparency, contested 
or ambiguous guidance and the opportunities created by input uncertainty for bias are further failings.  It is 
argued that how viability calculations are applied has been, is being and will continue to be shaped by power 
relations.  
 
Key words: Planning policy, planning obligation, financial viability appraisal, policy evaluation.  
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Introduction 
For over three decades in England, planning obligations have been the main mechanism by which 
the community has been able to capture some of the uplift in land values ‘released’ by planning 
permission.  Since around 2005, there has been an incremental but major shift in how policy 
regarding planning obligations has been formed and how planning obligations are negotiated for 
individual development schemes.  The shift has involved the financial viability of potential 
development becoming a central consideration in planning policy making and development 
management regarding planning obligations.  In essence, ostensibly to ensure that development is 
deliverable, a viability test involves a quantitative calculation of whether policies regarding 
planning obligations compromise a competitive financial return to the land owner and the 
developer.  In a period of high levels of policy innovation and/or volatility in the English planning 
system, this has been a fundamental change in the planning regime.  In policy making, the main 
application of financial viability modelling has been in the formation of local planning policy 
regarding planning obligations (mainly requirements for non-market housing provision and 
contributions to education, health, infrastructure and other community facilities).  Following the 
introduction of the Community Infrastructure Levy in 2012, local authorities were also required to 
apply financial viability tests to assess whether it would compromise deliverability.  For specific 
development schemes, viability calculations have been at the nexus of community opposition to 
proposed major regeneration projects.    It is the scheme, rather than policy making, level that is the 
main focus of this paper where issues of methodology and process in viability calculations have 
been extremely controversial (see Colenutt, Cochrane and Field, 2015). 
 
In the context of development management, particularly where a proposed development does not 
comply with policy, viability tests are increasingly being used as the basis for negotiating (and re-
negotiating) planning obligations for individual proposed development projects.  Whilst prima 
facie viability appraisal might seem like a straightforward, technical test, in practice it has proved 
very contentious.  Providing an impression of technocratic rationality, development viability 
appraisal can be conceptualised as a calculative practice that has become increasingly embedded in 
the English planning system.  A common attraction of quantification and technical models is that 
they appear to involve an apparently value neutral process.  However, their use can be associated 
with a tendency for unquestioning, institutionalised trust in numbers and, by reconfiguring 
subjective and contestable judgements as pseudo-scientific, may permit essentially political 
processes to be presented as technical procedures (Mennicken et al, 2008).  Given their 
implications for the allocation of land value uplifts between communities and land owners, the 
application of these apparently technocratic procedures has become increasingly controversial. In 
July 2015, Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, described financial viability assessments as 
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“something of a dark art”.  In this paper, the focus is on the operational issues that have emerged in 
the application of viability calculations in the English planning system. 
 
There is limited codified knowledge on the use of viability tests.  A great deal of what we ‘know’ 
about the role of viability tests is based upon the fragmented, often impressionistic, observations of 
market participants and planning professionals and case studies of specific schemes.  There has 
been no systematic research into the extent and nature of the use of viability tests in development 
management processes.  Similarly, there is little explicit knowledge on the procedures in place to 
evaluate viability appraisals. How consistent and rigorous are evaluation procedures?  Do local 
authorities and the Planning Inspectorate have the necessary expertise to adjudicate on viability 
issues?  Tension between the commercial confidentiality of developers and community 
participation in and the transparency of the planning process has been a particularly controversial 
issue with a number of adjudications by the Information Commissioner’s Office. 
 
This paper provides a formative, process evaluation of the introduction of financial viability 
criteria into development management via the use of development viability calculations.  The 
approach to evaluation is ‘realist’ in that the objective is to establish what it is about the policy that 
works (or does not work), for whom and in what circumstances?  Whilst the use of viability 
appraisal models has become increasingly controversial, there has been limited evaluation to date 
of the application of these calculative procedures.  It also needs to be acknowledged that, given the 
ideological and distributional salience of this issue, researcher objectivity is problematic.  Indeed, 
most academic researchers engaged in this area have been involved in writing guidance and 
advising governmental, professional and/or community organisations.  As such, the contribution of 
academics such as Professor Peter Wyatt and Professor Bob Colenutt has been both performative 
and analytic or descriptive.  Given this point and limited documented empirical research, the 
evaluation draws substantially on an element of participant action research. Whilst there are 
varying degrees of ‘insiderness’, the researcher’s participation in a range of relevant events and 
meetings, personal relationships with key participants and contributions to various consultation 
exercises provided multiple points of access to key concerns and perspectives on the topic.  This 
access, in addition to a review of documented analysis, empirical research and inference, informs 
this evaluation. 
 
Viability as a Policy Construct 
       
In this paper, the introduction of financial viability criteria into planning policy formation and 
development management is framed as a policy innovation.  Whilst policy making is often 
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understood to involve explicit articulation of activities undertaken by government, often through 
legislation, to achieve outcomes, policy can also be tacit or implicit and, rather than being formally 
stated, can be inferred from practice.  It may even involve a decision to be inactive.   The 
introduction of financial viability criteria into planning policy formation and decisions does not fit 
easily into a rationalist policy formulation model such as the ‘Rationale → Objectives → Appraisal 
→ Monitoring → Evaluation → Feedback’ cycle.  Lindblom's (1959) depiction of ad hoc, 
incremental, policy evolution by a ‘muddling through’ process of trial-and-error reflects the 
(almost certainly) unintended consequences of the introduction of financial viability criteria into 
the planning system.  In this specific context, the ‘morphogenesis’ of the policy as it has mutated in 
form and grown in scope and scale has created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Pawson et al., 2005).  In 
turn, as the policy of applying financial criteria has evolved and grown in scope and scale, there 
has also been a process of policy learning by central government policy makers, local planning 
authorities, professional institutions and community activists among others. 
 
It is difficult to identify an explicit theory or rationale for the policy change.  Central government 
planning policy makers did not make it explicit (at least to the public) how they believed that this 
policy instrument was going to work before its implementation. The underlying policy theory 
seems to have been implicit.  Within the broad objective of increasing the supply of both non-
market and market housing, the policy of financial viability testing seems to have been introduced 
in order to promote development stalled by the ‘burden’ of planning obligations that was rendering 
it financially unviable and ensure that sites were not allocated for development where it was not 
financially feasible to develop.  Viability modelling could also provide a basis for local authorities 
to demonstrate that their policies on planning obligations were consistent with appropriate 
economic incentives for land owners and developers.  The rationale for the use of viability 
calculations seems to have been to provide an objective mechanism for calculating the amount of 
planning obligations that could be generated by a project. It is unlikely that the policy of 
introducing financial viability criteria into planning decisions was initially designed to achieve 
some of the outcomes that have emerged.  Indeed, it is difficult to identify any conventional policy 
design at all.   
 
Given the scope and scale of the policy of using financial viability appraisals in planning decisions 
and policy making, an assessment of the outcomes of this policy change is particularly challenging.   
Many assumptions about appropriate measures, causal mechanisms and timescales would be highly 
contestable.  As in most policy innovations, a major problem in evaluation is the absence of valid 
counterfactuals.  It is widely assumed that the introduction of viability appraisals has enabled 
developers to decrease the level of land value capture through planning obligations than would 
otherwise have occurred.  However, it is extremely challenging to robustly estimate whether 
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observed outcomes are the products of policies changes.   In addition, as noted above, the policy 
has evolved and expanded in scope over time.  As such, the focus of this paper is on the process 
rather than the outcomes. 
 
It is also important to appreciate the wider housing policy context in which the policy of using 
viability calculations in planning has emerged.  Arguably the calculations and related guidance on 
their application could easily have evolved to favour the interests of the community.  At a 
presentation in 2015, Duncan Bowie (a former advisor on housing policy to the Mayor of London) 
outlined how, in the period 2001-2003, he pioneered ago the use of viability modelling.  In 2001-
2003, his aim was to provide a robust evidence base that could demonstrate that a planning policy 
of requiring provision of 50% non-market housing could be feasible in many areas of London.  
When viability appraisals initially emerged in negotiations on planning obligations, generally 
developers were (and remain) reluctant to ‘open their books’ and were resistant to the viability 
process.  In 2006, planning guidance from central government was exhorting local planning 
authorities to be more pro-active in seeking planning obligations and “to recognise that such 
obligations will increasingly be viable on new housing developments”.  However, the Coalition 
government (and its Conservative successor) formed in 2010 proved to be more sympathetic to the 
interests of land owners and private sector house builders.  In particular, a myriad of major policy 
initiatives and relatively minor pieces of policy guidance seem to reflect a broad policy prejudice 
against the provision of non-market, rental housing1 - the single most important source of 
community gain from planning obligations (DCLG, 2013).    
 
As noted above, the policy of introducing financial viability criteria in planning policy making and 
development management seems to have emerged in an incremental and ad hoc manner.  Circulars 
and Planning Policy Statements were the main instrument by which the policy was communicated 
to local planning authorities by the central government department responsible for national 
planning policies.  Essentially their planning circulars and policy statements provide non-statutory 
advice and guidance on particular issues to expand on subjects referred to in legislation.  They are 
used to explain policy and regulation more fully. Circulars can be quasi-legislative and include a 
direction or requirement to take specific action or provide guidance on implementation of aspects 
of planning  
                                                          
1 A few examples…The Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 permitted developers to obtain reductions in 
previously agreed and legally binding levels of planning obligations.  However, the level of provision of non-
market housing was the only planning obligation which could be amended.  The Vacant Building Credit 
introduced in 2014 enabled developers to be exempt from planning requirements for non-market housing 
if the space being redeveloped was vacant.  More broadly, in 2015 the government proposed to give 
tenants of housing associations a ‘right to buy’ their rental dwelling from the housing association at a 
discount to market value.      
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Table 1 
 
Financial Viability in Planning: Key Policy Documents and Events 
 
1998  Circular 6/98: Planning and Affordable Housing stated that when using planning 
obligations to deliver affordable housing, local authorities should ‘take account of the 
needs of developers and registered social landlords who must ensure that schemes are 
financially viable.’  However, formal modelling of project viability as part of planning 
processes did not begin. 
 
2001 Consultants (Three Dragons) commissioned by the GLA assessed viability of affordable 
housing policy across London and created a development appraisal ‘toolkit’ adapting 
long-established development appraisal models.  
 
2005 Circular 5/05: Planning Obligations stated that ‘In some instances,...it may not be 
feasible for the proposed development to meet all the requirements set out in local, 
regional and national planning policies and still be economically viable...decisions on 
the level of contributions should be based on negotiation with developers over the level 
of contribution that can be demonstrated as reasonable to be made whilst still allowing 
development to take place’.  Formal modelling of project viability begins to be used for 
development management and planning policy making.  
 
2006 A Communities and Local Government document Delivering Affordable Housing stated 
that “[E]ffective use of planning obligations to deliver affordable housing 
requires…realistic affordable housing targets and thresholds given site viability.”  
However, it is notable that the objective is to enable local authorities to “raise their game 
and to recognise that such obligations will increasingly be viable on new housing 
developments”.  
 
2006 Planning Policy Statement 3: Housing stated that Local Development Documents 
should “reflect an assessment of the likely economic viability of land for housing within 
the area” 
 
2008 Planning Policy Statement 12: Create Safe, Strong and Prosperous Communities 
through Local Spatial Planning emphasised justification of planning policy choices and 
a credible evidence base to support them.  It also stated that local authorities should 
ensure “that partners who are essential to the delivery of the plan such as landowners 
and developers are signed up to it.” 
 
2012 The National Planning Policy Framework (2012) stated the planning authorities should 
pay “careful attention to viability”.  
 
2013 The Growth and Infrastructure Act permitted developers to obtain reductions in already 
agreed levels of non-market housing ‘based on prevailing viability…supported by 
relevant viability evidence’ (DCLG, 2013: 4). 
 
2015 In the Government’s Spending Review and Autumn Statement, it is stated that “[T]he 
government will bring forward proposals for a more standardised approach to viability 
assessments, and extend the ability to appeal against unviable section 106 agreements to 
2018.” 
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policy.  Circulars and PPS can be interpreted as policy documents or “information instruments” 
that basically urge local authorities to do what government deems appropriate (Vedung and van der 
Doelen, 1998, p. 103).  Additional ‘information instruments’ may then set out how policies should 
progress from general principles to practice.  Table 1 sets out the chronology of policy documents 
that referred to the financial viability of development as a criterion for development management 
and/or planning policy making.  However, no procedural guidance was initially provided to local 
authorities on how the policy was to be implemented.  It has largely been left to local planning 
authorities individually to operationalise this policy initiative.   
 
As is discussed below, a wide range of issues have needed to be addressed as the policy of using 
viability calculations has been implemented.  Given the vacuum in terms of guidance on policy 
implementation, professional bodies (e.g. RICS, RTPI), lobbying organisations (e.g. Local 
Government Association) and quasi-autonomous government agencies (e.g. Homes and 
Communities Agency) proposed their own ‘rules’ for undertaking viability calculations and the 
related evaluation and consultation processes.  In 2016, Islington Borough Council was the first 
local planning authority to introduce detailed and comprehensive guidance on viability 
calculations.  Inevitably, the documents (or models) produced have reflected to various degrees 
the particular perspectives and interests of these organisation’s members and stakeholders.    A 
decade after the Circular in 2005, clearly implying some problems in how they are being used, the 
central government in its 2015 budget statement committed itself to bringing forward proposals 
for a more standardised approach to viability assessments.   
 
Development viability calculations: key principles 
 
The basic calculations underpinning development viability appraisal modelling are relatively 
simple.  As applied, it is a simple, rule-based, data model that involves estimating the costs and 
revenues from a development project.  Conventionally, the land value (often term the residual land 
value) is calculated as the difference between the value of the development project and the cost of 
developing the project.  This principle provides the basis of the standard calculative techniques that 
are used to estimate the value of development land or assets with development potential.  The basic 
calculation is:- 
     
RLV = DR – (DC+DP) 
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Where RLV is residual land value, DR are expected revenues generated by the development, DC 
are the expected costs of development and DP is required developers’ profit or return.  Whilst they 
can be disaggregated into much more detail, development costs broadly consist of a range of 
construction, professional fees, planning obligations and land transfer taxes.  Developers’ profit is 
a commonly expressed as a % of development costs or development revenues or as an internal rate 
of return.  Planning obligations and the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) affect both the costs 
and revenues.  Development revenues will usually be lower if there is a requirement to provide 
non-market housing.  Planning obligations concerning infrastructure provision and contributions to 
the provision of education, health and transport facilities may be provided ‘in kind’ by the 
developer or cash contributions.  They will tend to increase development costs. Finally, the 
viability test is that if the estimated residual land value is sufficiently in excess of the value of the 
land in its current use to incentivise the owner to sell the land, then it is concluded that 
development is financially viable.   This involves a comparison of the calculated land value with an 
estimate of, what has been termed, threshold or benchmark land value.  This latter concept has 
been probably the single most contested issue in development viability calculations and is 
discussed further below.  
 
Development Viability Modelling: Problems in Practice    
 
Whilst there has been a long established body of criticism of the use of planning obligations as a 
mechanism of value capture e.g. deadweight losses, regressive, payment in advance of earnings, 
lack of relationships with externalities generated etc. the evaluation below not does not address 
these wider, systemic issues.  The focus is on the policy of using a specific calculative technique as 
part of the development management process.  Jakeman et al, (2006) summed up very well some 
of the broad risks intrinsic to the use of technical models in public policy contexts.  
 
“The uses of models by managers and interest groups, as well as modellers, bring 
dangers.  It is easy for a poorly informed non-modeller to remain unaware of limitations, 
uncertainties, omissions and subjective choices in models.  The risk is then that too 
much is read into the outputs and/or predictions of the model.  There is also a danger 
that the model is used for purposes different from those intended, making invalid 
conclusions very likely” (Jakeman et al, 2006, 603). 
 
To date, empirical research has focussed on the use of DVAs in the formation of area-wide policy 
regarding land value capture through planning obligations (see Coleman et al., 2013 and 
McAllister et al. 2015).   Problems of policy obsolescence and lack of applicability to local site and 
market conditions were highlighted.   A key issue is that, in the local planning policy making 
context, development viability models are effectively estimating whether planning policies that 
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will be implemented in the future on actual sites are viable at present for hypothetical sites.  In 
addition, the consultation process was essentially limited to experts and community participation 
was absent until policy proposals were formed.   
 
Whilst resultant policies will create policy aspirations for specific development projects, the use of 
viability appraisals for individual projects in the development management process has been much 
more controversial.  Potential losses and gains are actual rather than hypothetical, they are short-
term rather than medium or long term, are being realised by individual developers rather than 
expressed as a policy and, are conclusive rather than being the commencement of a process of 
setting planning obligations for a scheme.  Gains and losses to the developer and/or landowner 
often directly correspond to losses and gains for the local community in the form of non-market 
housing, community facilities etc.  While there are weaknesses common to both uses of viability 
appraisals (area-wide local planning policy formation or scheme-specific local planning policy 
implementation), in this paper the focus is on the implementation of local planning policies 
regarding planning obligations at the development management stage.  The problems of viability 
appraisals are categorised in terms of; technical theoretical weaknesses, input and output 
uncertainty, problems of moral hazard and perverse incentives and weak governance.       
 
Model structure uncertainty  
 
Whilst the development appraisal models or techniques that have emerged from this Ricardian 
principle have been applied by the real estate development sector for many decades, there has 
always been a degree of model structure uncertainty.  Model structure uncertainty is caused by the 
processes of simplification and formulation inherent to any modelling (Wu and Li, 2006). In 
practice, a range of development appraisal models are used that incorporate different approaches 
to: the timing of costs and revenues; whether cost and revenue inflation should be incorporated; the 
inclusion of and assumptions about debt; and the appropriate metric of return or profitability (see 
Crosby et al, 2013).  In turn, these model structure uncertainties are also present in development 
appraisal models when applied in the planning context for viability calculations (see Crosby and 
Wyatt, 2015).  A significant number of these model structure uncertainties have been criticised in 
terms of their theoretical robustness. They may well persist in practice, because in terms of 
generating model output uncertainty, the level of model structure uncertainty is dominated by 
uncertainty in the model inputs (Byrne et al, 2012). 
 
Input and output uncertainty  
11 
 
 
It’s long been recognised that development appraisals are prone to input uncertainty. Half a century ago, in 
a Lands Tribunal decision, it was stated that “it is a feature of the residual valuation that comparatively 
minor adjustments to the constituent figures can have a major effect on results …” and “once valuers are 
let loose on residual valuations, however honest the valuers and however reasoned their argument they can 
prove almost anything”, First Garden City Ltd v Letchworth Garden City Corporation (1966) 200 EG 
123, 460. Accordingly, the residual valuation would be accepted by the Lands Tribunal only as a method 
of ‘last resort’.  However, in the absence of an alternative calculative technique, this method of last resort 
is essentially the basis of current viability calculations.  The apparent ability to prove almost anything is 
largely due to intrinsic uncertainty in the model inputs.   
 
As noted above, development viability modellers are essentially trying to estimate the development costs 
of a project (including a normal2 profit for the developer) and the revenues from the development.  
Outside the planning context, the most important model input assumptions tend to concern construction 
costs and sale prices.  Other variables tend to be a proportion of these figures e.g. professional fees are 
often taken as a percentage3 of construction costs.  Development viability modellers are faced with 
uncertainty in current price and cost levels and uncertainty in changes in prices and costs over the 
development period.  The development period itself is also subject to uncertainty.  Due to these 
uncertainties, nearly all the key inputs into a development viability appraisal can be estimated within a 
defensible range.  For instance, for a hypothetical apartment project, assumptions regarding construction 
costs anywhere between £2000 and £2500 psm., sale prices anywhere between £11,000 and £12,000 
psm., professional fees anywhere between 8% and 11% of construction costs etc. may all be justifiable.    
 
It has been in planning appeals where the assumptions of viability models have come under most public 
scrutiny.  In one planning appeal (Appeal Ref: APP/K5600/A/09/2097458 Parkes Hotel, 41-43 Beaufort 
Gardens, London SW3 1PW) for a site in a prime central London location, a developer was able to 
demonstrate that the proposed project was unviable at any level of planning obligations.  They argued that 
they were undertaking the project at a financial loss as part of a long-term strategy.  The Inspector’s 
judgement illustrates glaringly potential for disagreement in outputs due to input uncertainty. 
 
“The toolkit evidence produced on behalf of the appellant by Cushman & 
Wakefield shows a deficit of £7,663,007, without any affordable housing being 
provided. It was submitted that the appellant would incur an overall loss on the 
project, but that this would be accepted as part of his long term aspiration to carry 
                                                          
2 ‘Normal’ in this context is based upon the economic concept of a minimum profit necessary to attract and 
retain suppliers in a competitive market. 
3 However, the percentage itself may also be prone to uncertainty.  For example, broker’s fees may be 
assumed to be 0.5% or 0.6% etc. of sale prices.  Other variables are factual.  For instance, Stamp Duty is 
currently 4% of sale price of residential development land.   
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out improvements to Beaufort Gardens (and to allow further profit in the future). 
The appellant’s toolkit result is tested against a number of different scenarios, 
including the designation of Unit 5B as social rented housing and using the District 
Valuer’s opinion of market value and EUV. All of these scenarios produce a 
negative result.  
 
21. Toolkit evidence on behalf of the Council was provided by the District Valuer. 
With no affordable housing provision, the “against residual” figure shows a 
positive sum of £11,792,000. With 1 affordable unit (5B), the figure would be 
reduced to £10,822,000 and, with 2 affordable units (1B & 5B), £10,338,000.22. 
These are significantly different results, arising in the main from a number of disputed 
input values. Evidence for both parties was given by professionally qualified and 
experienced surveyors and valuers and I do not attempt to determine which figures are 
“correct.”” 
 
What constitutes a competitive return to the developer or a normal profit has also been the topic of some 
controversy.  Whilst Christophers (2013, 75) points disapprovingly to its “normalization” and perceives 
that profit “remains paramount, endemic” - somehow privileged, it is difficult to see how profit cannot be 
a factor in a market-led system of housing supply.  Further, whilst viability models make an allowance for 
expected developers’ profit, the actual level of profit on completion of the project is still subject to major 
uncertainty, is dependent on uncertain future revenues and costs and, consequently, can be substantially 
higher or lower than expectations.  Rather than the principle of profit itself, in practice the main issue 
concerning developers’ profit in the viability context has been the assumption of what should, prior to 
development, be an expected normal profit.  There can be a propensity in using technical models to seek 
simple, stable and general inputs.  In reality, a robust process for estimating some inputs can be complex, 
the inputs can be variable over time and can also be variable with the specific situation.   
 
Required profit tends to be closely linked to project risk which is driven by project-specific and market-
systematic factors. Market drivers will vary over time driven by the interaction of local and macro-
economic performance and the capital markets.  Individual projects will have different risk profiles.  With 
or without planning permission?  Phased or single building?  Long-term or short-term?  Pre-let or 
speculative?  Greenfield or brownfield?  So required profits levels should vary over time for the same 
project and vary between projects at any given point in time.   In practice, and perhaps not surprisingly, in 
the context of viability appraisals in the planning system developers have been attempting to set high 
profit benchmarks.  A 20% profit on revenue or a 20% internal rate of return per annum (both are quite 
different profit metrics) have emerged as benchmarks through, as one consultant commented personally to 
the author, “a mix of chutzpah and naivety”.  Nevertheless, it remains the fact that operationalising such 
concepts as a competitive return is problematic.  However, the most controversial concept to 
operationalise has been a competitive return to the land owner rather than a competitive return to the 
developer. 
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Whilst most inputs into a viability model are prone to uncertainty in their estimation, this is essentially due 
to imperfect information.  There can also be uncertainty in the interpretation of an input.  In most cases, 
the test of viability has been whether, at a given level of planning obligations, the residual land value is 
higher than, what is often termed, Threshold Land Value or Benchmark Land Value.  This land value 
threshold or benchmark is meant to determine what constitutes a competitive return to the land owner and 
where this benchmark is set is the key variable determining land value capture.  If the viability model 
output is a land value that is higher than the Threshold or Benchmark Land Value, then the planning 
obligations are regarded as deliverable.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the setting of Threshold Land Value has 
been at the heart of the controversy regarding the application of development viability modelling.  In the 
last decade, a blend of the professional bodies, local authorities, professional bodies and others have been 
trying to define the concept in their own interests with a range of perspectives being proposed.     
 
Many of the issues have been aired comprehensively in previous research (see Crosby and Wyatt, 2015 
and Coleman et al, 2013) The debate has crystallised into a contest about whether the threshold should be 
based upon the Existing or Alternative Use Value of the land or the current Market Value of the land.  
Whilst land owners and their representatives have favoured a Market Value based approach, the main 
criticism has been that there is a problem of circularity.  Market Value estimates are often based on the 
transaction prices of similar sites.  However, since land prices are influenced by the level of planning 
obligations, there is a risk that developers’ expectations of planning obligations implied in achieved land 
prices then constrain the level of planning obligations that are viable on other sites.  Central government 
seems to have been unwilling to provide clear guidance on this crucial issue.  Most of the guidance 
produced until recently has contained a degree of ambiguity.   
 
In its Planning Policy Guidance Note, the Department for Communities and Local Government stated that  
  
“In all cases, land or site value should: 
 
• reflect policy requirements and planning obligations and, where applicable, any Community 
Infrastructure Levy charge; 
• provide a competitive return to willing developers and land owners (including equity 
resulting from those wanting to build their own homes); and 
• be informed by comparable, market-based evidence wherever possible. Where transacted 
bids are significantly above the market norm, they should not be used as part of this 
exercise. 
 
The first and third bullet points are key and are not necessarily aligned. They have been given different 
weights in planning appeals.  In a 2015 planning appeal for a site in central London (Appeal Ref: 
APP/V5570/A/14/2227656 Former Territorial Army Site, 65-69 Parkhurst Road, London N7 0LP), the 
Planning Inspector displayed a very good understanding of the issues. He focussed on the topic of whether 
Existing Use Value should form the basis for estimating a competitive return to the land owner or whether 
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it should be based on current land prices evidenced by transactions.  Since the precedent is so central to 
land value capture in the English planning system, the Inspector’s judgement is worth quoting at some 
length.  
 
“In this context I can understand the wider concern of the Council about the possible effect of 
inputting purchase prices which are based on a downgrading of the policy expectation for affordable 
housing on the eventual outcome of a scheme viability appraisal. If such prices are used to justify a 
lower level of provision, developers could then in effect be recovering the excess paid for a site 
through a reduced level of affordable housing provision. Such a circularity has been recognised in 
research for the RICS, and the Council in its SPD and the GLA (in its Development Appraisal 
Toolkit Guidance Notes of 2014) are alive to this potential outcome of using purchase price as an 
input in viability assessment. The Council postulates an undesirable scenario of diminishing returns 
of affordable housing and eradication of the potential to achieve its delivery. It argues that the current 
appeal is an opportunity to return to a proper approach…” 
 
However, it becomes clear that the Inspector places more weight on the third bullet point from the 
Planning Policy Guidance rather than the third bullet point. 
 
“…the PPG stresses the need to take account of market signals. The only information on such signals 
in this case supports the use of the appellant’s land value figure. Importantly, the evidence does not 
suggest that a reasonable landowner would be incentivised to release the land for development at the 
value suggested by the Council. The options for a rational owner in a rising market include that of 
holding onto the land rather than selling it below a value indicated by the market. This is consistent 
with national guidance which seeks to avoid jeopardising viability. The boosting of housing 
development in general terms assists in the supply of affordable housing. National policy is firmly in 
favour of realism and flexibility where the viability of a development is in question. In this case, the 
market evidence supports a higher valuation for the site than that used by the appellant and the 
scheme is strictly not viable on the current figures. Taking all of the above into account, the 
appellant’s land value figure (roughly what they paid) can be regarded as adequately reflecting 
policy requirements on affordable housing. Bearing in mind that the development plan policy is to 
seek the maximum reasonable rather than the maximum possible amount of affordable housing, on 
the available evidence of the current position I consider that what is being offered in this case would 
achieve that.” 
 
Islington Council have been at the vanguard in attempting to resist this shift towards land prices for non-
policy compliant projects becoming the benchmark for testing viability and generating consequent 
reductions in land value capture.  Since this appeal, they have introduced their own guidance 
(Development Viability: Supplementary Planning Document, January 2016) which promotes Existing 
Use Value as the appropriate benchmark and, perhaps predictably, focuses on the first bullet point in the 
Planning Policy Guidance    
 
“… a key factor in determining the benchmark land value (and the level of premium over 
EUV) is the requirement set out in PPG that in all cases land or site value should reflect 
planning policies, planning obligations and CIL. This has the direct consequence of ruling 
out significantly inflated land values arising from the grant of permission, based on 
assumptions (built into purchase prices, transactions and/or land owner aspirations) which 
do not adequately reflect planning policy. These inflated values would, if adopted, make 
it almost inevitable that those policy requirements would be found to be unviable. Such an 
approach conflicts with the statutory planning framework and undermines the plan-led 
system as established in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) and the 
NPPF. 
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This conceptual contest which is crucial and central to land value capture continues.   
 
The estimation of viability model inputs in the planning context is then being determined by a broad range 
of technical, regulatory, ideological, market and behavioural factors, If the choice of model inputs were 
independent, it would be expected that some estimates of individual inputs would be at the upper end of 
the defensible limits; others would be at the lower end.  However, if development viability modellers 
systematically opt for pessimistic but reasonable and defensible assumptions in the development viability 
appraisals submitted in support of planning applications, land values or expected returns will be 
underestimated.  Whilst each individual model assumption may be reasonable and defensible, collectively 
the model inputs will be systematically biased.  Given that the output of such models – estimated land 
values or returns – can be very sensitive to relatively small changes in major inputs such as construction 
costs or sale prices, the implications for estimated planning obligations can be substantial.  Intrinsic 
uncertainty in the model inputs and consequent output uncertainty create the means by which 
development viability models can be systematically biased.  The process by which viability appraisals are 
formed produces an opportunity for opportunism. 
 
Incentives and Governance 
 
Given the financial trade-offs involved in land value capture, it is not surprising that site owners 
have major economic incentives to influence the outputs of viability models.   Broadly, over the 
last two decades a habitual issue has been deep disquiet about the ethics of information 
intermediaries such as rating agencies, auditing firms and equity analysts (see Lin and McNichols, 
1998 and Michaely and Womack 1999 on equity analysts; for ratings agencies see Bolton, Freixas 
and Shapiro, 2012; and for auditing firms see Gaver and Paterson, 2007).  Real estate appraisal has 
been lower profile but there is also a well-established body of research that finds consistent 
evidence that clients can bias real estate appraisal outcomes (see Crosby et al, 2015 for a review).  
Termed economic dependence, the blend of individual and business incentives to attract and retain 
client fees in a context of inadequate regulatory oversight has been seen on numerous occasions to 
produce unethical bebaviour.   
 
The vast majority of development viability appraisals are produced by consultants.  This quotation 
from Norman Ralph Augustine perhaps identified the potential problem too bluntly – “All too 
many consultants when asked ‘What is two plus two?’ respond ‘What do you have in mind?’” For 
area-wide viability calculations commissioned by local authorities, McAllister et al. (2015) found 
that limited economic incentives, weak understanding of the viability techniques by local 
politicians and planners, reputational risks for consultants, the participation of local market 
participants and public scrutiny of outputs provided sufficient controls on potential opportunistic 
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behaviour by local planning authorities.  For scheme-specific viability calculations, the contrast is 
stark.  They are commissioned by land owners.   It is the land owner who pays for the viability 
appraisal4.  As noted above, there are substantial economic incentives for the land owner and the 
consultant to produce biased appraisals.  The land owner themselves is often an expert on 
development appraisal and can exploit inherent input uncertainty to their advantage.   The viability 
calculations are typically confidential and not subject to public scrutiny.    
 
Guidance on the conduct of viability appraisals is beginning to emerge that attempts to control for 
potential opportunistic behaviour.  The Islington SPD on development viability appraisal 
introduced a requirement for a statutory declaration from the applicant company confirming that 
the assessment submitted to the council is a true and fair reflection of the viability of the proposed 
development; and that costs and values in this assessment are consistent with current costs and 
values within (or used as a starting point for) viability assessments that have been undertaken for 
internal or financial purposes.  In addition, the declaration should state that the company 
undertaking the assessment has not been instructed on the basis of performance related pay or is 
incentivised in any other way according to the outcome of the viability process and the level of 
planning obligations that the applicant is required to provide.  However, given the facts that any 
viability appraisal is a snapshot at a fixed point in time, that there is intrinsic uncertainty in the 
inputs and that economic dependence is embedded in the production of viability appraisals, it is 
difficult see how such requirements can effectively reduce the scope for bias.   
 
The inability of the community to scrutinise viability models has also been a source of 
considerable dispute.   There is a well-established body of work on public participation and 
transparency in the planning system (see Sheppard, Burgess and Croft, 2015 for a review).  De 
Fine Licht (2014) demonstrates the relationships between perceived transparency, perceived 
fairness and decision acceptance.   Adams and Watkins (2014, 18) argue that: 
“Democratic participation that enhances public understanding and acceptance of 
controversial development projects is a more effective way to secure the legitimacy and 
acceptance of long-term investment decisions than resort to the courts.” 
 
In England, whilst a number of high profile cases have gone to the Information Commissioner for 
adjudication, land owners and developers have been able to submit viability models on a private 
and confidential basis.  The Information Commissioner has had to judge whether the potential 
damage to the economic interests of the developer or land owners should take precedence over the 
benefits of transparency.  Potential harm for developers has focussed on disclosure of 
                                                          
4 It also seems to be the case the land owner pays for any evaluation of their appraisal by an expert 
appointed by the local planning authority.  This can create a relationship of economic dependence between 
the consultant scrutinising the viability appraisal and the land owner.  
17 
 
commercially valuable information, protection of commercial bargaining positions, avoidance of 
commercially significant reputational damage and disclosures that could would otherwise result in 
a loss of revenue or income.  Judgements by the Information Commissioners have been 
inconsistent.  In some cases, full disclosure has been ordered, on others partial disclosure has been 
recommended and no disclosure has been recommended in a number of cases.  In the most recent 
case, regarding the redevelopment of a shopping centre in Hackney, London, the Information 
Commissioner concluded that “The public interest in favour of disclosure is outweighed by the 
public interest in maintaining the exception.” (ICO, 2015: 17).  Whilst Islington BC have 
attempted to embed public disclosure in their SPD, despite the fact that the main purpose of 
submitting viability appraisals is to justify a lower level of  
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 Table 2          A Summary of the Key Difficulties of Development Viability Calculations 
       
 Problems Type Primary cause Importance Preventable? Comments 
1 Model input uncertainty Information uncertainty Imperfect information High No  
2 Output uncertainty Result uncertainty Input uncertainty High No  
3 Ambiguous guidance on competitive return to the land owners Contested guidance Lack of consensus High Yes 
Requires clear and authoritative 
guidance 
4 Conflicting guidance Weak governance Lack of consensus High Yes Requires clear and authoritative guidance 
5 Poor transparency Weak governance Procedural weakness High Yes Requires clear and authoritative guidance 
6 Model structure uncertainty Weak technique Persistence of poor practice Low Yes Requires clear and authoritative guidance 
7 Incentives to bias inputs Moral hazard Production process High Yes Requires viability calculators to be independent 
8 Potential non-independence of consultants Moral hazard Procedural weakness High Yes 
Requires viability calculators to be 
independent 
9 Complex and costly process Weak technique Large range of data required Low Yes Simpler approaches are possible 
10 Lack of expertise in planning profession Knowledge limitations 
Lack of experience and 
education  Low Yes 
Independent advice can be 
procured and/or better education 
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land value capture by the community, the vast majority of viability appraisals remain unavailable 
to the community.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the last decade, viability calculations have become progressively embedded in many parts of the 
plan making and development management processes of the English planning system.  Largely 
through planning obligations, these calculative techniques have thus become a central component 
of the land value capture process.  Whilst it is generally presumed that the quantity of land value 
capture has reduced because of the introduction of viability calculations, there has been no research 
that has actually investigated the effects of viability testing on the amount of land value capture 
and other impacts.  How much development has occurred that would not otherwise have occurred?  
How much non-market housing, community facilities etc. have been ‘lost’?   These are important 
and challenging empirical research questions that this paper has not addressed. 
 
The focus of this paper has been largely on the process of viability testing and on evaluating 
whether viability calculations are fit for purpose.   In practice, the purpose of the policy of applying 
viability calculations has not been explicit.  Its applications imply that the purpose has been to 
provide a rational basis for testing whether planning policies, including policies for land value 
capture, can be implemented by market participants.  In the development management context, as a 
neutral tool, viability calculations are essentially being used to calculate the capacity for value 
capture from a proposed project.  A key problem is that the calculations are prone to substantial 
intrinsic uncertainty in a large number of the model inputs. Whilst calculations provide an 
impression of scientific precision, this is spurious.  The key inputs into development viability 
appraisals are saturated with uncertainty.  The result is a large degree of uncertainty in the outputs 
and, therefore, the potential value capture.  Land value capture that is based on such outputs is, to 
some (also uncertain) extent, capricious.  This is unavoidable and it may be a cost that is 
outweighed by the potential benefits of viability calculations.  This intrinsic model input 
uncertainty produces a contest over the calculations and, in turn, facilitates opportunistic 
behaviour. 
   
Although it’s an evolving topic with new guidance and precedents regularly emerging, a key issue 
in the use of viability applications has been poor governance and competing guidance.  Given the 
clear incentives for developers and land owners to bias viability calculations, the economic 
dependence of many viability consultants on developers and land owners, the lack of transparency, 
contested or ambiguous guidance and the opportunities created by input uncertainty for bias, it 
should not be surprising that land owners tend to be able to demonstrate that they are unable to 
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comply with policies on planning obligations.  This tendency has been occurring in a city with 
some of the highest land values in the world.  Of course, weaknesses in guidance and governance 
can be addressed - if there is a political will. 
 
Given the broader planning policy context in which viability calculations have become so 
prevalent, it would be a “rationalist’s fantasy” to ignore the power strategies and micro-politics 
involved in viability calculations (Forester, 1999, 177).  Even if there is the political will to 
‘standardise’ the process of viability calculations, procedural guidance can be shaped to favour 
different interests.  Networks of government ministers, civil servants, policy advisors, political 
parties, lobbying groups, corporations, professional bodies, think-tanks, activists etc. constitute the 
policy venues or deliberative arenas which, even to insiders, are often only partially visible and 
who have been trying to shape how viability calculations are produced.  Developers and land 
owners have been better resourced than local authorities and, debateably, have had a more 
sympathetic hearing from a Government that has been eager to stimulate the private housing 
market.  The unresolved equivocality surrounding the concept of Threshold Land Value provides a 
striking illustration of ambiguity that has been constructive from the perspective of land owners 
and destructive from the perspective of the wider community.          
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